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Abstract
Credit rating agency assessments of sovereign risk bear weak statistical association with the quality of country
policies. This paper demonstrates that where endogenous responses by policy makers to credit rating outcomes,
and the degree of responsiveness of credit rating agencies to policy changes are accounted for, strong associations
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1. Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has again shifted attention onto the signiﬁcance of sound
macroeconomic stabilization policy. Credit rating agencies provide services to capital markets con-
cerning the risk of sovereign debt.
Surprisingly, however, good economic policy does not show as strong an association with interna-
tional credit ratings of countries as one might expect. For instance, for a sample of 60 countries for
which ratings are available consistently for a period of at least 12 years, Moody’s rating of govern-
ment bonds shows little relation to the growth performance of the economy and inﬂationary pressure.
Figure 1 provides summary illustration by reference to Moody ratings for the periods available2 and
associated real GDP growth rates, while Figure 2 repeats for the inﬂation rate. Our choice of policy
variables is dictated by the fact that growth is the most fundamental determinant of long term pro-
1 The research support of Economic Research Southern Africa is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the South African Reserve Bank.
2 Moody ratings from C through Aaa were assigned numeric scores over the 1 through 21 range, in order to render them
numeric. Appendix A provides the precise coding values.
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Fig. 1
Fig. 2: Due to scale distortions, we have omitted the hyperinﬂationary period in Brazil during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
ductivity changes, while inﬂation is a useful indicator of price and policy distortions confronting an
economy.3
One response to this observation might be that it provides evidence of the ineﬃciency of ratings
agencies. However, market-based indicators of risk such as the interest rate diﬀerential between any
3 Note that other policy variables that might be of interest, such as the ratio of debt to GDP, are more diﬃcult to interpret.
Thus a high Moody rating may allow for a higher level of borrowing in the market, while a low rating precludes borrowing.
The result is that any interpretation of the association cannot infer causality running from policy to rating outcome.
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speciﬁed country and US government debt yields, also show little sign of systematic association.4
Since agents in markets have strong proﬁt incentives to eliminate asset mispricing, it is diﬃcult to
argue that the absence of a strong systematic association between the quality of policy and interest
rate diﬀerentials is simply due to market ineﬃciencies or information asymmetries. Consideration of
the market incentives that ratings agencies face accounts for the consistent results across risk agency
and market-based indicators of risk. Since ratings agencies provide assessments of risk to market
participants, consistent failure to respond to either negative or positive relevant information would be
unlikely to sustain demand for the ratings agency’s services. This does not preclude the possibility
of temporary failures on the part of ratings agencies, but it reduces the probability of systematic and
protracted deviations.
Of course, it may be additional dimensions of policy that matter for markets and the rating agen-
cies. However, as the discussion under Section 2 demonstrates, even when the range of macroe-
conomic fundamentals is expanded considerably, the proportion of the variation in ratings reported
remains limited. This is true irrespective of which rating agency is considered - incidentally Moodys
records the closest match between fundamentals and rating outcomes. The point that the association
between fundamentals and ratings outcomes is imprecise, thus readily generalizes beyond growth and
inﬂation.
This paper therefore explores another possibility. Its starting point is the proposition that if credit
ratings matter (say for the cost of borrowing), and if policy quality impacts on the rating, then the
policy outcome and the credit rating come to be endogenous to one another. In the model the paper
presents, ratings agencies place countries into distinct risk categories. Quality of policy choices do
aﬀect the categorizing decisions of ratings agencies. As a result, policy makers will seek to inﬂuence
ratings through the policy choices they make. Crucial to the decision making of the policy maker,
will be the extent to which the credit rating will prove to be responsive to the changes in policy. The
model demonstrates that for both policy makers in countries with favorable risk ratings, and for those
with unfavorable ratings, it is possible that policy makers will respond rationally either by sound, or
by unsound policy choices. The major determinant of the distinction will be the sensitivity of the
ratings agency to changes in policy.
2. Background and Problem Statement
There exists an extended literature on credit rating agencies (CRAs) and sovereign default risk.5
The fundamental rationale of CRAs is that in the presence of asymmetric information, they pro-
duce and disseminate costly information, useful to investors in pricing information-sensitive securi-
ties, reducing information costs and increasing the pool of borrowers and raising liquidity of credit
markets - see Millon and Thakor (1985). Alternative justiﬁcations identify certiﬁcation functions
used in the classiﬁcation of assets for ﬁnancial regulatory purposes either by central banks or under
Basel II capital adequacy assessments (Canuto et al, 2012; Kiﬀ et al, 2012), and monitoring and
coordination functions in the presence of multiple equilibria (Boot et al, 2006).
Consistent with the understanding of CRAs as providing information, a number of studies have
attempted to account for ratings outcomes on the basis of macroeconomic fundamentals.6 A founda-
4 For most countries we employed yields on long-term government bonds. Due to data constriants, in some instances we
employed Treasury Bill rates, or lending rates instead. For the sake of parsimony, we do not illustrate the resultant associations
- they are available from the author on request.
5 For historical background material on the credit rating agencies, see Levich et al (2002), White (2012), and for the method-
ologies they employ see Bhatia (2002).
6 See for instance Afonso (2003), Bisoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), Butler and Fauver (2006), Cantor and Packer (1996b),
Canuto et al (2004, 2012), Cavallo et al (2008), Ga¨rtner et al (2011), Georgievska et al (2008), Larraı´n et al (1997), McNamara
and Vaaler (2000) and Valler and McNamara (2004). Note that there is a separate literature that addresses a symmetrical set of
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tional study by Cantor and Packer (1996b) controlled for real per capita GDP, inﬂation, growth, the
ratio of total external debt to exports, the absence of default history, the level of economic develop-
ment, and ﬁscal and current account deﬁcits. But after accounting for real GDP per capita, real GDP
growth, inﬂation, central government deﬁcits, central government gross debt, openness and total net
external debt, Canuto et al (2012) account for a minimum of 3.8% (for the S&P rating) and a max-
imum of 27% (for the Moody rating) of the variation in the ratings outcomes (the average is 11%),
once unobserved country heterogeneity is controlled for.7
The implication is that while a wide array of macroeconomic fundamentals is correlated with the
ratings provided by CRAs, such fundamentals account for only a limited proportion of the variation
of the ratings.
One response has been to extend consideration of determinants of the ratings to additional dimen-
sions, such as political risk (see Georgievska et al, 2008; Valler et al, 2006).
Another interpretation of this evidence is that there is a decoupling between macroeconomic fun-
damentals and the ratings that CRAs provide, suggesting an ineﬃciency of ratings agencies in assess-
ing the risk of sovereign default.8 But given the correspondence of credit ratings with market-based
signals, and the willingness of market participants to pay for CRA ratings, this is too naı¨ve an assess-
ment.
An alternative reading of the evidence is therefore to suggest that the fact that macroeconomic
fundamentals incompletely account for rating outcomes, demonstrates precisely that CRAs provide
informational content beyond that which can be inferred from publicly available macroeconomic
indicators, perhaps because CRAs focus on long time horizons thereby avoiding excessive inﬂuence
from temporary cyclical volatility in macroeconomic indicators (for instance see Altman and Rijken,
2004), or the ability of CRAs to capture the credibility of policy (see for instance Hauner et al, 2010,
with respect to the new member states of the EU in contrast to other emerging markets).
That CRAs ratings contain information not publicly available was precisely an inference drawn
from the original Cantor and Packer (1996b) results,9 and would serve to explain the market’s will-
ingness to pay for CRAs services. The inference that CRAs provide valuable information to markets
is reinforced by a range of empirical ﬁndings that demonstrate that CRAs ratings inﬂuence spreads
(see Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1999; Dell’Arriccia et al, 2006; Mauro
et al, 2006; Afonso et al, 2007, Jamarillo and Tejada, 2011) and the cost of borrowing of sovereigns
(see Gande and Parsely, 2005; Kiﬀ et al, 2012).10 It would also explain the use of CRA-ratings in
linear and other transforms in order to construct measures of sovereign risk in a range of studies (see
Ul-Haque et al, 1996; Sy, 2002; Eichengreen et al, 2003; Reinhart et al, 2003; Borio and Packer,
2004; Baek et al, 2005; Kim and Wu, 2006; Remolona et al, 2008).
But the literature has also highlighted a range of shortcomings that attach to the information sig-
nals of CRAs. For instance, the literature notes that CRAs frequently disagree in their assessments
questions with respect to corporate debt - we omit further discussion since corporate debt lies beyond the scope of our concern
with sovereign risk.
7 Similar explanatory power to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is reported for ﬁrst diﬀerence estimators. The authors report
much higher R2 values under a pooled cross-sectional model. But this eﬀectively leaves the majority of the explanatory power
attributable to unobservable (and time-invariant) heterogeneity (they suggest level of development and default) that is not due
the wide array of macroeconomic fundamentals that they do explicitly control for.
8 This response is not unpopular. See for instance the discussion in Arezki et al (2011), Cannata (2012), Frost (2006),
Ga¨rtner et al (2012), Hunt (2012), Ryan (2012a,b), Schwartz (2012), Tichy (2011).
9 Cantor and Packer (1996) ﬁnd that a single rating explains 92% of bond spreads in their sample, and that the rating, while
correlated with macro fundamentals, independently aﬀects the spreads.
10 There is also evidence that changes in ratings of emerging markets has spill-over eﬀects across emerging markets - see
Kaminsky and Schuckler (2002) and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010). For a discussion of issues arising from the impact of
ratings on credit default sawp spreads for corporate debt, see Finnerty et al (2013). Given our focus on sovereign risk ratings,
and the diﬀerential functions of CRAs in the two markets (see Canuto et al, 2012), we do not pursue discussion of this literature
further.
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(more frequently for sovereigns than for corporate bonds), raising concerns over the credibility of
ratings (see Cantor and Packer, 1996a). It is therefore not surprising that not all CRAs appear to gen-
erate impacts on spreads (see Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1997). In addition, CRAs on some accounts
systematically underestimate risk of default, with macroeconomic fundamentals and political factors
predicting a higher chance of default than implied by CRA ratings (see Georgievska et al, 2008).
In similar vein, Reinhart (2002) and Rojas-Suares (2001) report poor predictive power of CRA rat-
ings for debt defaults. Additional evidence suggests that CRAs ratings lagged market assessment
of sovereign risk in the case of the Mexican crisis of the 1990s (see Larraı´n et al, 1997). Similar
concerns have followed both the Asian (see Reinhart, 2002) and recent global crisis (see Kiﬀ et al,
2012).
The upshot of the evidence in the literature is therefore two-fold: ﬁrst, macroeconomic fundamen-
tals do appear to inﬂuence ratings, but the inﬂuence is found to be incomplete and imprecise; second,
ratings are found to inﬂuence the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, but again the impact is found to
be incomplete, imprecise and prone to miss large shocks.
Now suppose that both elements of the story carry truth content. Fundamentals do aﬀect ratings.
Ratings do aﬀect borrowing costs. What follows immediately is that sovereigns have an incentive
to adjust policy so as to aﬀect fundamentals, in order to inﬂuence ratings and thereby the cost of
borrowing. The consequence would be that any speciﬁcation either linking ratings to underlying
macroeconomic fundamentals, or linking borrowing costs to CRA ratings, would face severe endo-
geneity problems, thereby potentially rendering empirical estimation results biased and inconsistent.
Yet the literature to the best of our reading has not corrected estimation results for this problem,
which would serve to account at least in part for the imprecision in estimation.
This paper takes the possibility of a behavioral response of sovereigns to ratings seriously, and
explores its consequences.
The premise of the model is that sovereigns (countries) are allocated to distinct risk ”classes” by
CRAs. The risk class to which a country is allocated is a function of the quality of its macroeconomic
fundamentals. Macroeconomic fundamentals in turn are determined by the policy choices of the
sovereign. The model of this paper shows that diﬀerential expectations over the success of policy
changes in realizing improved credit ratings, can result in an incentive to either ”over”- or ”under”
invest in the quality of policy - which would serve to explain the weak association between observed
policy outcomes and credit ratings.
Since countries adjust their policy behavior so as to modify macroeconomic fundamental perfor-
mance, in order to realize membership of improved risk classes and so improve the net return on
borrowing in capital markets, this results in circumstances that are akin to sporting leagues, in which
teams are divided into diﬀerent contests, conditional on the quality of their performance.
As a consequence, while the model presented here is novel, it does have analogues in analyses of
sports leagues.11 For instance, Noll (2002) presents a proﬁt maximization model for sports clubs that
is dependent on investment in player quality.12 The implication of the model is that under constant
market conditions and team locations, teams seek higher quality under promotion and relegation than
in leagues of ﬁxed size if teams are more proﬁtable in higher leagues. This is similar to our model,
in the sense that just as sporting teams can over- and underinvest in player quality, depending on
their beliefs about conditions in the higher/lower league for whose membership they are competing,
policy makers in our model can pay too much or too little attention to policy quality, in order to gain
membership of more favorable risk ratings.
11 I am grateful to Stephen Ross for pointing out this literature to me.
12 Note that although many European football clubs are claimed not to operate under a goal of proﬁt maximization (Kesenne
2000, 2007), there is a widespread view that the threat of relegation leads many clubs to spend all available revenues on player
talent, resulting in minimal proﬁtability (Kuper and Szymanski 2009).
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However, it is also important to note that our circumstances diﬀer in important respects from
sporting leagues. Of particular signiﬁcance given the model we present below, is the fact that pro-
motion and relegation between sporting leagues generates a strategic contest between teams that face
the threat of relegation or promotion. This feature is absent from the ratings processes practiced by
CRAs. The fact that one country achieves a better (worse) rating, does not entail that another country
receives a downgrade (upgrade) in its rating. As a consequence, there is no strategic game between
sovereigns in the ratings process. On the other hand, as we show in the discussion which follows,
there may well be a strategic interaction between individual sovereigns, and the CRAs.
3. The Model
Our model posits benevolent policy makers that seek to make optimal policy choices. In the model,
credit rating agencies that respond to the quality of policy choices of sovereigns by the likelihood with
which they assign countries to diﬀerent risk classes.
Choice agents are economic policy makers (governments; the President; the Minister of Finance).
The objective of policy makers is to choose policies that both improve macroeconomic fundamentals,
as well as the likelihood of obtaining a good credit rating from rating agencies. Denote macroeco-
nomic fundamentals by Γ. The decision variable is the quality of policy adopted by government,
denoted Q. Policy quality impacts the macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy, rendering them
functionally dependent on policy quality, Γ (Q). We posit benevolent policy makers that seek the best
possible macroeconomic fundamentals for the economy.
Countries are assessed either by a ratings agency or by the markets in terms of their risk proﬁle. For
analytical tractability, let countries fall into two classes (A-rating, B-rating), reﬂecting diﬀerential risk
perceptions. Notationally, denote the two risk categories into which rating agencies place countries
as i ∈ {a, b}, where a denotes an A-rating, b a B-rating. Consistent with the empirical ﬁndings
that macroeconomic fundamentals impact on CRA-ratings, policy quality impacts the probability
with which a country receives an A- or B-rating. Since it is the choice of policy quality that comes
to functionally determine macroeconomic fundamentals, and macroeconomic fundamentals in turn
are held to functionally determine the probability of each of the two possible ratings, this renders
the probability of either rating functionally dependent on policy quality. Accordingly we denote
the probability of assigning a country to an A-rating, recognizing its functional dependence on the
choice of policy quality, by 0 ≤ p (Q) ≤ 1, and hence the probability of assignment to a B-rating by
(1 − p (Q)). We constrain ∂p/∂Q > 0, such that the probability of being placed under an A-rating
increases in policy quality.
While in principle the functional dependence of macroeconomic fundamentals on policy choices
may be identical across CRA risk categories, there are several good reasons to suggest that this will
not be the case in general. Typically countries are not homogeneous in terms of their institutional
capacity. This relates both to the degree of development of their regulatory institutions (such as
the central bank, ﬁscal authorities, ﬁnancial market regulators, etc.) and the depth of market struc-
tures in economies (for instance, typically ﬁnancial markets show greater depth with higher levels of
economic development). The extent of both public and private institutional development therefore
carries with it the potential of a diﬀerential impact of changes in discretionary action by policy mak-
ers on macroeconomic fundamentals. The human capital capacity available to policy makers across
countries is also not always homogeneous. Diﬀerences in levels of training, the absolute number of
technocrats with requisite training, and the depth of exposure to relevant market conditions requiring
policy action, all tend to vary across sovereign jurisdictions. Finally, the quantity, relevance, quality
and reliability of data available for the formulation of policy tends to be heterogeneous across coun-
tries. These diﬀerences may themselves substantially explain why countries fall into diﬀerential risk
classes.
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For these reasons, we allow for the possibility that the nature of the functional dependence of
macroeconomic fundamentals, Γ, on policy choices, Q, may be distinct across the two categories
of countries. This does not preclude the possibility that countries may also be homogeneous in the
way their macroeconomic fundamentals depend on policy quality. But for generality we allow for
heterogeneity. Then:
Γi (Q) , ∀i ∈ {a, b} (1)
under a concavity in policy quality assumption, such that ∂Γi/∂Q  0, ∂2Γi/∂Q2 < 0.13
Symmetrically, the probability of assignment to an A-rating given any choice of policy quality
may be distinct for countries currently assigned to an A- or a B-rating:
0 ≤ pi (Q) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {a, b} (2)
with the probability of assignment to a B-rating, (1 − pi (Q)), similarly diﬀerentiated across the cur-
rent country categorization.
Finally by assumption there exists a strict ordering such that:
Γa > Γb > 0 (3)
to reﬂect the intuition that countries are placed into the two distinct risk classes by the markets or
rating agency by virtue of the nature of their macroeconomic fundamentals (see the review of the
empirical literature).
Since our choice agents seek to inﬂuence both macroeconomic fundamentals and the likelihood of
receiving a good credit rating, the decision problem of the policy maker is given by:14
argmax
Q
Vi (Q) = pi (Q) Γa (Q) + (1 − pi (Q)) Γb (Q) , ∀i ∈ {a, b} (4)
with associated ﬁrst order condition:15
∂Vi (Q)
∂Q
= 0, ∀i ∈ {a, b} (5)
13 Implicit in the concavity assumption is that investment in policy quality, while improving the macroeconomic fundamentals
and hence economic welfare, is costly, and that the cost is convex in the investment in policy quality. Thus we may posit that
Γi (Q) = Ri (Q) − Ci (Q), s.t. ∂Ri∂Q > 0, ∂
2Ri
∂Q2
< 0, and s.t. ∂Ci∂Q > 0,
∂2Ci
∂Q2
> 0, where Ri (Q) denotes the welfare beneﬁts of
improving macroeconomic fundamentals, Ci (Q) the cost of doing so. This provides the strict concavity implication we state.
The analysis of the paper can be conducted rendering the welfare beneﬁts and costs of investment in policy quality explicit.
The inferences of the paper remain the same as those reported. For this reason we adopt the more parimonious representation.
14 Note that while in principle the decision problem of the sovereign is one that is repeated over time, absent any non-
linearities in adjustment costs, and under a time-invariant discount rate of 0 < ρ < 1, then simply gives the expected value
decision problem for policy makers of argmax
Q
∑∞
i=0 ρ
iE (Γ)t+i, trivial in any dynamic sense. For this reason we suppress any
discussion of dynamics.
15 A brief note on risk aversion on the part of policy makers. Note that for E [Γ (Q)], we have:
∂2E [Γ (Q)]
∂Q2
=
∂2pa (Q)
∂Q2
[Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)] + pa (Q) ∂
2Γa (Q)
∂Q2
+ (1 − pa (Q)) ∂
2Γb (Q)
∂Q2
By assumption, ∂2Γa (Q) /∂Q2 < 0, ∂2Γb (Q) /∂Q2 < 0. For risk aversion, therefore, ∂2pa (Q) /∂Q2 < 0, is certainly suﬃcient.
Where ∂2pa (Q) /∂Q2 > 0 should apply, risk aversion would necessitate:
∂2pa (Q)
∂Q2
[Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)] < −pa (Q) ∂
2Γa (Q)
∂Q2
− (1 − pa (Q)) ∂
2Γb (Q)
∂Q2
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3.1. Implications for Investment in Policy Quality: country heterogeneity in policy quality respon-
siveness
The decisions of policy makers of any one country under either an A- or a B-rating are not strate-
gically interdependent, in the sense that the probability of relegation, and likewise the probability of
promotion between categories, do not depend on what policy makers in other countries do.
Suppose that the functional dependence of macroeconomic fundamentals on policy choices are
not identical across CRA risk categories, so that (1), (2) and (3) apply.16
Then the FOC for countries with an a-rating diﬀer from the FOC of countries with a b-rating. For
a-rated countries we require that:
∂pa
∂Q
Γa (Q) + pa (Q)
∂Γa
∂Q
+
∂ (1 − pa)
∂Q
Γb (Q) + (1 − pa (Q)) ∂Γb
∂Q
= 0
while for b-rated countries:
∂pb
∂Q
Γa (Q) + pb (Q)
∂Γa
∂Q
+
∂ (1 − pb)
∂Q
Γb (Q) + (1 − pb (Q)) ∂Γb
∂Q
= 0
such that:
∂Γa
∂Q
=
( −1
pa (Q)
) [
∂pa
∂Q
Γa (Q) +
∂ (1 − pa)
∂Q
Γb (Q) + (1 − pa (Q)) ∂Γb
∂Q
]
= −
[(
∂pa/∂Q
pa (Q)
)
(Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)) +
(
1 − pa (Q)
pa (Q)
)
∂Γb
∂Q
]
(6)
and symmetrically, for b-rated countries:
∂Γb
∂Q
=
( −1
1 − pb (Q)
) [
∂pb
∂Q
Γa (Q) + pb (Q)
∂Γa
∂Q
+
∂ (1 − pb)
∂Q
Γb (Q)
]
= −
[(
∂pb/∂Q
1 − pb (Q)
)
(Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)) +
(
pb (Q)
1 − pb (Q)
)
∂Γa
∂Q
]
(7)
While the optimal policy choices of a- or b-rated countries are not strategically interdependent,
the optimal actions of policy makers in countries in the a-rating do depend on the responsiveness
of macroeconomic fundamentals to changes in policy quality in b-rated countries - and vice versa.
Speciﬁcally, the FOC (6) makes ∂Γa/∂Q functionally dependent on (∂Γb/∂Q), while for b-rated coun-
tries, there is a symmetrical dependence on ∂Γa/∂Q.
3.1.1. The Outcome for a-rated Countries
Suppose that the policy makers are rational.
16 Note that where the impact of improvements in policy quality on the policy environment in a-class countries is identical to
that in b-class countries, (∂Γa/∂Q) = (∂Γb/∂Q) = ∂Γ/∂Q, the FOC reduces to:
∂pa
∂Q
[Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)] + ∂Γ
∂Q
= 0
Since by assumption [Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)] > 0, and ∂pa/∂Q > 0, it follows that:
∂Γ
∂Q
< 0
i.e. policy makers are compelled to invest in ”good” policy beyond the policy environment optimizing point.
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Then, a-rated country policy makers can infer the responsiveness of macroeconomic fundamentals
to changes in policy quality in b-rated countries directly by means of (7). By substitution it follows
that:
∂Γa
∂Q
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1 − pa (Q))
(
∂pb
∂Q
)
− (1 − pb (Q))
(
∂pa
∂Q
)
pa (Q) − pb (Q)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)) , pa (Q)  pb (Q) (8)
The marginal reduction in the probability of relegation for an a-rated country is given by:
ηa ≡ ∂pa/∂Q1 − pa (Q) (9)
while the marginal reduction in the probability of remaining relegated in the b-rating is given by:
ηb ≡ ∂pb/∂Q1 − pb (Q) (10)
Under the assumptions that (Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)) > 0, pa (Q)  pb (Q), it then follows from (8) that:
∂Γa
∂Q  0 i f
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ηa
ηb
< 1
ηa
ηb
= 1
ηa
ηb
> 1
where pa (Q) > pb (Q) and ∂Γa∂Q  0 i f
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ηa
ηb
> 1
ηa
ηb
= 1
ηa
ηb
< 1
where pa (Q) < pb (Q)
(11)
In terms of whether policy makers in the a-rated countries will invest heavily in policy quality
(in the sense that (∂Γa/∂Q) < 0, beyond the (∂Γa/∂Q) = 0 optimization point), weakly in policy
quality (in the sense that (∂Γa/∂Q) > 0, below the (∂Γa/∂Q) = 0 optimization point), or ”optimally”
in policy quality (in the sense that countries simply follow standard optimization strategies, such that
(∂Γa/∂Q) = 0), this results in ﬁve categories of countries in the a-rating, determined by the interplay
of two factors:
• The impact of investing in policy quality in avoiding relegation from the a-rating to the b-rating
(ηa), relative to its impact in raising the probability of promotion from the b-rating (ηb). The
relative impact can be high (ηa/ηb > 1), low (ηa/ηb < 1), or equal (ηa/ηb = 1).
• The relative magnitude of the probability of maintaining an a-rating (pa (Q)) to the probability
of being promoted from the b- to an a-rating (pb (Q)). Since by assumption pa (Q)  pb (Q),
the logical possibilities are that the relative magnitude is greater (pa (Q) > pb (Q)), or less
(pa (Q) < pb (Q)) than.
The ﬁve resultant categories of a-rated countries are then:
• Escape Relegation: Where ηa/ηb > 1, and pa (Q) > pb (Q), policy makers will invest heavily
in policy quality ((∂Γa/∂Q) < 0). Since there is a high return to investment in policy quality in
terms of lowering the probability of relegation from the a- to the b-rating, while there is a low
prospect of being promoted again from the b-rating after relegation, there is strong incentive to
invest in policy quality while the country is in the a-rating in order to avoid relegation, since
once demoted to the b-rating it is more diﬃcult to return to the a-rating. Investment in policy
quality is thus a preemptive strategy to avoid relegation ”at all cost.”
• Ensure Re-Promotion: Where ηa/ηb < 1, and pa (Q) < pb (Q), policy makers will invest heav-
ily in policy quality ((∂Γa/∂Q) < 0). Since there is a relatively high return to investment in pol-
icy quality in terms of raising the probability of repromotion from the a- to the b-rating, while
there is a relatively high prospect of being promoted again from the b-rating after relegation,
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there is considerable incentive to invest in policy quality in order to maximize the probability
of repromotion should the country fail to avoid relegation to the b-rating. Investment in policy
quality is thus a preemptive strategy to improve the chances of re-promotion.
• Resting on Laurels: Where ηa/ηb < 1, and pa (Q) > pb (Q), policy makers will invest weakly
in policy quality ((∂Γa/∂Q) > 0). Since there is a relatively low return to investment in policy
quality in terms of avoiding the probability of relegation, while the prospect of maintaining an
a-rating is high regardless of investment in policy quality, there is a disincentive to invest in
policy quality, since it has little impact on avoiding relegation, and the chances of remaining in
the a-rating is high in any event.
• Resignation: Where ηa/ηb > 1, and pa (Q) < pb (Q), policy makers will invest weakly in policy
quality ((∂Γa/∂Q) > 0). Since the probability of re-promotion to the a-rating is viewed as being
high regardless of present investment in policy quality, relegation represents insuﬃcient risk to
trigger current heavy investment in policy quality.
• Simple Rationality: Where ηa/ηb = 1, countries simply follow standard optimization strategies,
such that (∂Γa/∂Q) = 0. As a result, the level of investment in policy quality will be less
intensive than for Escape Relegation or Ensure Repromotion type countries, but higher than
for Resignation or Resting on Laurels type countries.
Table 1 summarizes.
pa (Q) > pb (Q) pa (Q) < pb (Q)
ηa
ηb
> 1 Escape Relegation: Resignation:
High Policy Quality Low Policy Quality
ηa
ηb
= 1 Simple Rationality: Simple Rationality:
Intermediate Policy Quality Intermediate Policy Quality
ηa
ηb
< 1 Resting on Laurels: Ensure Re-Promotion:
Low Policy Quality High Policy Quality
Table 1: a-rated country outcomes
3.1.2. The Outcome for b-rated Countries
The result for the b-rated countries is symmetrical to that for a-rated countries.
Again assume policy makers to be rational. Then, b-rated country policy makers can infer the
responsiveness of macroeconomic fundamentals to changes in policy quality in a-rated countries by
(6), and by substitution it follows that:
∂Γb
∂Q
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pb (Q)
(
∂pa
∂Q
)
− pa (Q)
(
∂pb
∂Q
)
pa (Q) − pb (Q)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)) (12)
The marginal increase in the probability of remaining promoted thanks to investment in policy
quality for an a-rated country is given by:
μa ≡ ∂pa/∂Qpa (Q) (13)
while the marginal increase in the probability of promotion from the b- to the a-rating due to invest-
ment in policy quality is given by:
μb ≡ ∂pb/∂Qpb (Q) (14)
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Under the assumptions that (Γa (Q) − Γb (Q)) > 0, pa (Q)  pb (Q), it then follows from (8) that:
∂Γb
∂Q  0 i f
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μb
μa
< 1
μb
μa
= 1
μb
μa
> 1
where pa (Q) > pb (Q) and ∂Γb∂Q  0 i f
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μb
μa
> 1
μb
μa
= 1
μb
μa
< 1
where pa (Q) < pb (Q)
(15)
As for a-rated countries, whether policy makers in the b-rated countries will invest heavily in
policy quality (so that (∂Γb/∂Q) < 0, beyond the (∂Γb/∂Q) = 0 optimization point), weakly in
policy quality (so (∂Γb/∂Q) > 0, below the (∂Γb/∂Q) = 0 optimization point), or ”optimally” in
policy quality (in the sense that countries simply follow standard optimization strategies, such that
(∂Γb/∂Q) = 0), this results in ﬁve categories of countries in the b-rating, determined by the interplay
of two factors:
• The impact of investing in policy quality in raising the probability of being promoted from the
b- to an a-rating (μb), relative to its impact in raising the probability of remaining promoted
in the a-rating (μa). The relative impact can be high (μb/μa > 1), low (μb/μa < 1), or equal
(μb/μa = 1).
• The relative magnitude of the probability of maintaining an a-rating (pa (Q)) to the probability
of being promoted from the b- to an a-rating (pb (Q)). Since by assumption pa (Q)  pb (Q),
the logical possibilities are that the relative magnitude is greater (pa (Q) > pb (Q)), or less
(pa (Q) < pb (Q)) than.
The ﬁve resultant categories of b-rated countries now are:
• Strategic Investment: Where μb/μa > 1, and pa (Q) > pb (Q), policy makers will invest strongly
in policy quality ((∂Γb/∂Q) < 0). Since there is a relatively high return to investment in policy
quality in terms of increasing the probability of promotion, and a high probability of remaining
promoted once a-rated, there is an incentive to invest in policy quality while the country is b-
rated to achieve promotion. Investment in policy quality is a strategy to escape the lower rating,
and to gain promotion to the higher rating, taking advantage of the productivity of investment
in policy quality while in the lower rating.
• Ensure Promotion: Where μb/μa < 1, and pa (Q) < pb (Q), policy makers will invest strongly
in policy quality ((∂Γb/∂Q) < 0). Since there is a relatively high prospect of being promoted
from the b-rating, and the impact of investment in policy quality will be high once promotion
is secured (μa > μb) there is an incentive to invest in policy quality, to take advantage of
the chances of promotion, and the ability to increase the probability of avoiding re-relegation
should the a-rating be achieved.
• Fatalism: Where μb/μa < 1, and pa (Q) > pb (Q), policy makers will invest weakly in policy
quality ((∂Γb/∂Q) > 0). Since there is a relatively low return to investment in policy quality
in terms of achieving promotion, while there is a relatively low prospect of being promoted
from the b-rating, there is a disincentive to invest in policy quality, since it has little impact on
achieving promotion, and the chances of promotion are low in any event.
• Banking on Inevitability: Where μb/μa > 1, and pa (Q) < pb (Q), policy makers will invest
weakly in policy quality ((∂Γb/∂Q) > 0). Since the probability of promotion to the a-rating is
viewed as being high regardless of present investment in policy quality, policy makers await
the promotion without resorting to improvement in policy quality.
• Simple Rationality: Where μb/μa = 1, policy makers simply follow standard optimization
strategies ((∂Γb/∂Q) = 0). As a result, the level of investment in policy quality will be less
intensive than for Strategic Investment or Ensure Promotion type countries, but higher than for
Fatalism or Banking on Inevitability type countries.
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Table 2 summarizes.
pa (Q) > pb (Q) pa (Q) < pb (Q)
μb
μa
> 1 Strategic Investment: Banking on Inevitability:
High Policy Quality Low Policy Quality
μb
μa
= 1 Simple Rationality: Simple Rationality:
Intermediate Policy Quality Intermediate Policy Quality
μb
μa
< 1 Fatalism: Ensure Promotion:
Low Policy Quality High Policy Quality
Table 2: b-rated country outcomes
3.1.3. The Empirical Implication
Fundamentally the model above carries the empirical prediction that the association between pol-
icy quality and credit risk ratings will be conditional on both the probability of falling into the a-
and b-ratings categories, and the responsiveness of the rating to policy improvements. Tables 1 and
2 illustrate. Note that this distribution of policy outcomes would be consistent with the descriptive
evidence of Figures 1 and 2 of the introduction of the paper, in the sense that the model predicts
that there will be no direct clear association between risk assessments and the quality of government
policy performance.
Instead, the expectation is now that policy outcomes will be better under a high responsiveness of
the rating agency to improvements in policy quality.
3.2. A Simple Representation of the Implied Interaction Between Policy Makers and the Rating
Agency
The obvious question at this point is why the credit rating agency manifests such a range of re-
sponses to the choices of policy makers. Why not simply adopt a ∂pi/∂Q, i ∈ (a, b) value that creates
a strong incentive for policy makers to adopt the best possible policy?
Part of the answer to this puzzle emerges from a recognition from any rational rating agency that
policy makers may themselves rationally choose to adopt poor policy regardless of the responsiveness
of ratings to changes in underlying policy quality, depending on the expectation of the policy makers
on realizing high or low ratings. As the previous section has shown, policy makers may adopt any of
∂Γi/∂Q  0, conditional on ∂pi/∂Q, i ∈ (a, b) as well as pa (Q) and pb (Q).
Failure of the rating agency to correctly anticipate the choice of policy quality by the policy maker,
carries the risk of a loss of reputation for the rating agency. Ideally the rating agency would like to
show a strong responsiveness in ∂pi/∂Q, i ∈ (a, b) only where ∂Γi/∂Q ≤ 0 (i.e. there is a strong
investment in policy quality), and a low responsiveness where ∂Γi/∂Q > 0 (i.e. there is a weak
investment in policy quality).
Thus, while there is no real strategic interaction between countries in their pursuit of ratings, there
is a strategic interaction between countries and the rating agency.
To explore this, we allow the country policy makers to choose between the ∂Γi/∂Q ≶ 0 alterna-
tives.
The credit rating agency chooses how responsive it is to changes in policy quality, by allowing
either ∂pi/∂Q → 0 (low responsiveness), or ∂pi/∂Q 	 0 (high responsiveness). Allowing the
notational convention that λ represents either ηa/ηb or μb/μa, the implication is that for small changes
in probability values in response to policy changes, ∂pi/∂Q → 0, it follows that λ → 0, while for
large changes in probability values to changes in policy quality, ∂pi/∂Q 	 0, it follows that λ→ ∞.
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The most intuitive timing assumption is to allowing policy makers and rating agencies to exercise
their strategic choice simultaneously and independently, to reﬂect the ongoing and continuous nature
both of ratings evaluations and of policy decisions.17 This provides the normal form game illustrated
in Table 3, where the ci and ri denote the country and rating agency payoﬀs respectively.
Rating Agency
λ→ ∞ λ→ 0
Policy ∂Γi
∂Q < 0 c1, r1 c2, r2
Maker ∂Γi
∂Q > 0 c3, r3 c4, r4
Table 3: Normal Form Interaction between Sovereigns and Rating Agencies
Provided that for reputational reasons the credit rating agency wants to get its assessments of
countries ”right,” we can assume that r1 > r2, and r4 > r3. Similarly, if countries wish ratings to
reﬂect their policy choices, then c1 > c3, and c4 > c2.
Under strategic uncertainty, there is no unique Nash equilibrium, hence equilibrium strategies are
mixed strategies.
Denote the belief structure of the rating agency by θR = (q, 1 − q), where q denotes the subjec-
tive probability the rating agency attaches to ∂Γi/∂Q < 0 (i.e. high policy quality being played by
the policy makers), such that 1 − q denotes the subjective probability the rating agency attaches to
∂Γi/∂Q > 0 (i.e. low policy quality being played by the policy makers).
Symmetrically, we denote the belief structure of the country policy makers by θC = (m, 1 − m),
where m denotes the subjective probability the country policy maker attaches to λ → ∞ (i.e. high
responsiveness of the rating agency to changes in policy quality), such that 1−m denotes the subjective
probability the policy maker attaches to λ → 0 (i.e. low responsiveness of the rating agency to
changes in policy quality).
The implied equilibrium mixed strategy probability values are then given by:
σC =
(
r4 − r3
(r1 − r2) + (r4 − r3) ,
r1 − r2
(r1 − r2) + (r4 − r3)
)
σR =
(
c4 − c2
(c1 − c3) + (c4 − c2) ,
c1 − c3
(c1 − c3) + (c4 − c2)
)
where σC denotes the equilibrium mixed strategy for country policy makers, and σR denotes the
equilibrium mixed strategy for the rating agency.
Note the implications. It is increases in the payoﬀs that attach to low rating responsiveness to
changes in policy quality (high r4 and r2), that serve to increase the (r4 − r3) diﬀerence, or lower the
(r1 − r2) diﬀerence, so as to raise the equilibrium likelihood of high policy quality ∂Γi/∂Q < 0 and
lower the probability of poor policy quality ∂Γi/∂Q > 0 being played by policy makers respectively.
Hence, the rating agency has good reason to emphasize the payoﬀs that attach to low rating respon-
siveness to changes in policy quality (high r4 and r2), since it serves to emphasize the need for policy
makers to be particularly vigilant on policy quality, and hence raises the associated probability value.
On the other hand, it is increases in c4 and c3 that serve to increase the (c4 − c2) diﬀerence and
lower the (c1 − c3) diﬀerence, that serve to raise the equilibrium likelihood of high responsiveness of
the rating agency to changes in policy quality λ → ∞, and lower the equilibrium likelihood of low
responsiveness of the rating agency to changes in policy quality λ → 0 respectively. Hence policy
17 The obvious question then is why the game is not presented in dynamic form. Strictly, the game is repeated. However,
since there is no change in the structure of the strategic interaction over the repeated games, any stage game solution will also
be sub-game perfect. Dynamics are therefore suppressed for convenience of presentation.
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makers have good reason to emphasize the attractiveness of poor policy choices, so as to increase the
responsiveness of the rating agency to improvements in policy.
The net empirical implication of this is that even if we account for the possibility of strategic in-
teraction between policy makers and the rating agency, the positive association between the respon-
siveness of the rating agency to changes in policy and the quality of policy should be maintained.
However, we note that the inference is also that the quality of policy, and the responsiveness of the
rating agency codetermine one another - causality does not run simply from one to the other.
4. Empirical Evaluation
In what follows, we explore the empirical implications of the model we have presented. We
consider evidence both from sample means, as well as more analytical evidence.
4.1. Data
We employ the following data:
• The Moody rating of sovereign government debt. Moody ratings from C through Aaa were as-
signed numeric scores over the 1 through 21 range, in order to render them numeric. Appendix
A provides the precise coding values.
• IMF international Financial Statistics on the following: the interest rate;18 the growth rate of
real GDP; the GDP-deﬂator based inﬂation rate.
Data was collected on a total of 60 countries. Unavailability of Moody ratings on sovereign gov-
ernment debt for more than 5 annual observations limited the sample to 60 countries. The list of
countries included in the study is reported in Appendix B of the paper.
The sample period was set to 1980 through 2013, though for a range of countries particularly
Moody ratings on sovereign government debt were available only for sub-sample periods.
4.2. Baseline Evaluation
In our baseline evaluation of the empirical evidence, we classify data points of countries as falling
either into the a-rating category, or the b-rating category, as well as whether the responsiveness of the
rating of a country is high or low.
In our data sample, where we include the hyperinﬂationary periods of Brazil and Bulgaria, the
mean Moody rating is 15.99 (median 17.00), while under exclusion of the hyperinﬂationary period
the mean Moody rating is 16.07 (median 17.00). We then classify each observation as falling into
either a high or low Moody rating (corresponding to our a-rating or b-rating categories), conditional
on whether the observed Moody rating for that year falls above or below the sample mean value.
Unfortunately we are not able to observe the beliefs that policy makers hold about the impact on
both the probability of maintaining the existing rating a country holds, nor their beliefs concerning
the impact of policy quality on probability structures should the country be recategorized to alterna-
tive risk proﬁles. Our recourse is to proxy the responsiveness of the Moody ratings to the quality of
policy maintained19 by means of the correlation between changes in Moody ratings and changes in
either the growth rate in real GDP, or the inﬂation rate (as determined by the GDP deﬂator). High
18 We employed data as consistently as possible across coutnries. However, due to diﬀerential data availability, we employed
the lending rate, the Treasury Bill rate as well as the government bond rate.
19 The the ηa/ηb and μb/μa ratios of the model.
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responsiveness is allocated to cases where the correlation falls above the sample mean, low respon-
siveness where it falls below the sample mean.20 Note that the correlations across the two policy
variables have diﬀerent interpretations. For growth, a positive correlation implies that higher growth
is associated with an improved rating. For inﬂation, a positive correlation implies that improved
ratings are associated with higher inﬂation. To aid interpretation, in this section we report results
employing reversed signs in the case of inﬂation, to render interpretation consistent across the two
policy measures.
In the introduction, we have already reported the weak association between policy quality and
Moody ratings outcomes. In Table 4, we report the mean growth rate in our sample for all data points
for which the country Moody rating lay above, and below the sample mean value of the Moody
rating. Where the data includes the hyperinﬂationary period in Brazil and Bulgaria, note that the
mean growth rate of countries highly rated by Moody’s is 3.15% per annum; that of countries with
low Moody ratings 3.74%. Where we exclude the hyperinﬂationary period, the diﬀerential is even
more marked - with highly rated countries reporting 2.92% growth on average, poorly rated countries
3.98% on average. We also report these growth averages after eliminating outlier observations in the
sample growth rate, that appear particularly large - while the reported averages change marginally,
they do not change the underlying pattern: that countries that obtain low Moody ratings, on average
report higher growth rates than do countries with high Moody ratings. This accords with the ﬁndings
of our introduction: with respect to growth, good policy does not readily translate into better Moody
ratings.
With Hyperinﬂation Without Hyperinﬂation
Below Mean Above Mean Below Mean Above Mean
Moody Moody Moody Moody
Growth 3.74 3.15 3.98 2.92
Removing Growth Outliers Removing Growth Outliers
Growth 3.74 3.12 3.79 2.62
Table 4: Growth Performance of Countries with High and Low Moody Ratings
In Table 5 we report the mean inﬂation rates in our sample for all data points for which the country
Moody rating lay above, and below the sample mean value of the Moody rating. Where we include
the hyperinﬂationary periods in Brazil and Bulgaria, there does appear to be a dramatic diﬀerence be-
tween countries with high and with low Moody ratings. For those with high Moody rating scores, the
mean inﬂation rate is 3.49%, for countries with low ratings a considerably higher 33.63%. However,
where we remove the hyperinﬂationary observations (12 observations out of our total data set of 1342
observations), notice that the distinction is considerably less dramatic: highly rated countries report
an average inﬂation of 3.29%, countries with low ratings 11.15%. Admittedly, lowly Moody rated
countries on average still have inﬂation four times as high as the highly rated countries - but 12% in-
ﬂation is hardly indicative of crisis-level inﬂation, yet Moody ratings continue to reﬂect considerable
risk. Once again, therefore, the dramatic diﬀerences in Moody ratings between countries, and the
associated lending costs this translates into for countries, does not appear to have strong association
with the objective underlying policy performance of countries.
Now consider the eﬀect of conditioning this evidence on the responsiveness of Moody ratings to
changes in policy.
20 This is a simpliﬁcation from the model: it really captures only the extent to which the rating changes in the existing risk
class - not the counterfactual of what would happen if the country was reassigned to the alternative risk class. The latter is
unobservable.
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With Hyperinﬂation Without Hyperinﬂation
Below Mean Above Mean Below Mean Above Mean
Moody Moody Moody Moody
Inﬂation 33.63 3.49 11.15 3.29
Table 5: Inﬂation Performance of Countries with High and Low Moody Ratings
In Table 6, we again report the mean growth rate in our sample for all data points for which the
country Moody rating lay above, and below the sample mean value of the Moody rating, but we also
diﬀerentiate between data points associated with high and low responsiveness of the Moody rating
to changes in the growth performance of countries. Note that the evidence now conforms precisely
with the predictions of our model. Countries for which the responsiveness of Moody ratings is high
(above sample mean), invariably record higher growth performance than countries with a Moody rat-
ing responsiveness that is below average. Indeed, the highest growth performance in sample is now
recorded for cases that have both an above average Moody rating, and an above average responsive-
ness of the Moody rating to policy changes. Conversely, the lowest growth performance occurs for
countries which have high Moody ratings, but where the Moody rating does not respond strongly to
policy changes.
With Hyperinﬂation Without Hyperinﬂation
Responsiveness of Below Mean Above Mean Below Mean Above Mean
Moody to Policy Change: Moody Moody Moody Moody
Growth Above Mean 3.89 4.13 3.89 4.14
Below Mean 3.33 2.74 3.42 2.74
Removing Growth Outliers Removing Growth Outliers
Growth Above Mean 3.89 4.13 3.58 4.13
Below Mean 3.33 2.69 2.68 2.69
Table 6: Growth Performance of Countries with High and Low Moody Ratings
Table 7 repeats the exercise for inﬂation. Again we report the mean inﬂation rate for all data
points for which the country Moody rating lies above and below the sample mean, but diﬀerentiate
between data points associated with low and high responsiveness of the Moody rating to changes
in the inﬂation rate of countries. Again the evidence conforms with the predictions of our model.
Countries for which the responsiveness of Moody ratings is high (above sample mean), invariably
record lower inﬂation performance than countries with a Moody rating responsiveness that is below
average. For the data that includes the hyperinﬂationary evidence, the lowest inﬂation rates occur in
countries that have both an above average Moody rating, and an above average responsiveness of the
Moody rating to policy changes - once the hyperinﬂation is removed, there is not much diﬀerence
between countries with high and low Moody ratings, provided only that the responsiveness of Moody
ratings with respect to policy changes is above average. Conversely, the highest inﬂation performance
occurs for countries which have low Moody ratings, but where the Moody rating does not respond
strongly to policy changes (in inﬂation).
It is worth noting that in the case of the growth policy outcome, the poorest policy performance
occurs in countries that have a high Moody rating, but where there is a low responsiveness of the
rating to changes in policy. In the case of inﬂation, while the pattern is not quite as stark, nonetheless
countries with high Moody ratings but low rating responsiveness, have a worse inﬂationary track
record than countries with a low Moody rating, but with a high rating responsiveness. These patterns
are precisely those predicted by the model. And they make good intuitive sense. If policy makers
of a country with a high Moody rating know that there is a low probability of a change in the rating
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With Hyperinﬂation Without Hyperinﬂation
Responsiveness of Below Mean Above Mean Below Mean Above Mean
Moody to Policy Change: Moody Moody Moody Moody
Inﬂation Above Mean 13.14 3.88 3.05 3.89
Below Mean 68.60 3.05 13.17 7.98
Table 7: Inﬂation Performance of Countries with High and Low Moody Ratings
even under poor policy performance, there is no longer a strong incentive for policy makers to behave
well.
4.3. An Econometric View
Symmetrical evidence can be generated econometrically.
Our baseline estimation is given by:
Pi,t = α0 + αM
(
dMi,t
dPi,t
)
+ γi + δt + εi,t (16)
where Mi,t denotes the Moody rating Pi,t denotes the policy measure of interest (either growth, or the
inﬂation rate) of country i, in period t.
(
dMi,t/dPi,t
)
denotes the correlation measure of the respon-
siveness of the rating to changes in policy. εi,t denotes the error term, γi, δt country and time eﬀects
respectively. For the sake of robustness, we also estimate:
Pi,t = α0 + αM
(
dMi,t
dPi,t
)
+ αRMi,t + αDDit + γi + δt + εi,t (17)
where Mi,t, denotes the level of a country’s rating by Moody, and Dit controls for shocks arising
from unusual growth episodes. For estimation purposes, we excluded the two countries in our sample
with dramatic hyperinﬂationary episodes (Brazil, Bulgaria), since the magnitude of the outliers they
introduce overrides all other data associations. For this reason, the need to control for hyperinﬂation
in estimation is eliminated.
The expectation under our model is that for growth, αM > 0, while for inﬂation αM < 0.
We deal with the endogeneity of
(
dMi,t/dPi,t
)
by instrumentation.21 For growth we employ in-
struments suggested by the recent growth literature, that points to the importance of geography22 and
institutions.23 As measures of geography we employ latitude and longitude (denoted lat and lon); for
institutions measures of legal origin ( for English, Socialist, French and German legal origin, denoted
L Eng, L S oc, L Fr, L Ger respectively)24 and the measure of democratization from POLITY-IV
(denoted Polity2).25 For inﬂation we employ the interest rate (IntRat), and the consumption and ex-
port intensity of GDP (consumption and exports as a percentage of GDP, denoted C GDP, X GDP
respectively). The interest rate serves an indicator of monetary policy, consumption as percentage of
GDP as an indicator of aggregate demand, and exports as a percent of GDP as an indicator of external
shocks to the economy.
21 An alternative might have been provided by GMM estimators which employ higher order lags of levels and/or diﬀerences
of regressors in the panel as instruments to test for the robustness of the simple correlation. The relatively short time dimension
in a number of our country data points precludes this option.
22 See Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup et al (1999).
23 See the discussion in Acemoglu et al (2005) for instance.
24 See La Porta et al (1998, 1999) for these measures. Our excluded category is Scandinavian legal origin.
25 From the INSCR (2009) data set.
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Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dMi,t
dPi,t
61.71∗∗∗
(6.59)
58.66∗∗∗
(6.48)
60.71∗∗∗
(6.57)
54.67∗∗∗
(5.86)
49.27∗∗∗
(5.76)
51.21∗∗∗
(5.74)
Mi,t 0.15∗∗
(0.07)
0.16∗∗
(0.07)
0.25∗∗∗
(0.07)
0.26∗∗∗
(0.07)
Dit 11.41∗∗
(5.19)
11.33∗∗∗
(4.35)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
T ime No No No Yes Yes Yes
n 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313
ad j − R2 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.34 0.35 0.40
* denotes sig at the 10% level; ** denotes sig at the 5% level; *** denotes sig at the 10% level;
round parentheses report standard errors; square parentheses denote signiﬁcance levels
Table 8: Estimation Results for Growth
In f lation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dMi,t
dPi,t
−147.95∗∗∗
(23.78)
−145.67∗∗∗
(24.42)
−161.25∗∗∗
(28.25)
−158.89∗∗∗
(29.15)
Mi,t −0.31
(0.29)
−0.40
(0.30)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
T ime No No Yes Yes
n 1279 1279 1279 1279
ad j − R2 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.41
* denotes sig at the 10% level; ** denotes sig at the 5% level; *** denotes sig at the 10% level;
round parentheses report standard errors; square parentheses denote signiﬁcance levels
Table 9: Estimation Results Inﬂation
Results for growth are reported in Table 8. Columns (1) through (6) the results from using the
instrumented variable (ﬁrst stage regression results are reported in Column (1) of Table 10). We ﬁnd
that greater responsiveness of ratings to changes in the policy outcome measure given by growth, is
always associated with statistically signiﬁcantly better growth outcomes, regardless of whether the
level of the Moody rating, or exceptional growth episodes are controlled for.
Estimation results thus conﬁrm the predictions of the model.
Inﬂation results are reported in Table 9. Columns (1) through (4) reports the results from using
the instrumented variable (ﬁrst stage regression results are reported in Column (1) of Table 11).
Symmetrically to the growth speciﬁcation, greater responsiveness of ratings to policy changes is
associated with lower inﬂation, in all instances statistically signiﬁcantly, irrespective of whether the
level of ratings is controlled for.
Legitimacy of the instrumentation strategy is examined under the estimation methodology pro-
posed by Altonji et al (2002). The approach is brieﬂy described in Appendix C. The approach allows
for the possibility that the instruments are not entirely independent of the outcome variable of interest
(here the growth rate, and the inﬂation rate), corrects all variables in order to render them orthogo-
nal to the instruments, and tests for stability and signiﬁcance of association between the orthogonal
transforms.
Results are reported in Table 10 for growth, and Table 11 for inﬂation respectively. Columns (1)
and (2) report the Altonji et al ﬁrst stage regressions, columns (3) and (4) the tests for the signiﬁcance
of the association between the orthogonal transforms of the variables.
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dMi,t
dPi,t
∗
Growth∗ Growth −Growth∗
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lat −0.001
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.01)
dMi,t
dPi,t
− dMi,tdPi,t
∗
43.52∗∗∗
(16.88)
45.96∗∗∗
(15.41)
lon 0.001∗
(0.001)
−0.004
(0.003)
I GDP 0.31∗∗∗
(0.10)
0.28∗∗∗
(0.09)
L Eng −0.05
(0.07)
1.03∗∗
(0.45)
L S oc 0.05
(0.06)
0.23
(0.47)
L Fr −0.003
(0.07)
0.24
(0.47)
L Ger −0.02
(0.07)
−0.60
(0.39)
Polity2 −0.01
(0.01)
−0.12∗∗∗
(0.04)
I GDP 0.01∗
(0.003)
0.28∗∗∗
(0.82)
Const. 0.09
(0.11) ()
Country Yes Yes
T ime No Yes
n 1253 1313 1253 1253
R2 0.24 0.22 0.02 0.27
* denotes sig at the 10% level; ** denotes sig at the 5% level; *** denotes sig at the 10% level;
round parentheses report standard errors; square parentheses denote signiﬁcance levels
Table 10: Test of Instrumentation Strategy Growth
dMi,t
dPi,t
∗
In f lation∗ In f lation − In f lation∗
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IntRat −0.01∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.97∗∗∗
(0.09)
dMi,t
dPi,t
− dMi,tdPi,t
∗ −166.33∗∗∗
(1.61)
−167.05∗∗∗
(1.44)
X GDP 0.0003
(0.001)
−0.005
(0.02)
C GDP 0.002
(0.004)
−0.13
(0.10)
Constant −0.18
(0.29)
8.39
(8.30)
Country Yes Yes
T ime No Yes
n 1220 1220 1220 1220
R2 0.07 0.56 0.99 0.99
* denotes sig at the 10% level; ** denotes sig at the 5% level; *** denotes sig at the 10% level;
round parentheses report standard errors; square parentheses denote signiﬁcance levels
Table 11: Test of Instrumentation Strategy Inﬂation
Notable is that the impact of the responsiveness of the rating agency to changes in policy ori-
entation remains statistically signiﬁcant, and of the correct sign, even after we have accounted for
the possibility that our policy measure (growth, inﬂation) is possibly not entirely independent of the
variables employed in our instrumentation strategy.
The implication is thus not only that at least part of the relationship between the responsiveness
of the rating agency to changes in policy and the policy outcome variables (growth, Inﬂation) is
generated by the responsiveness of the rating agency to changes in policy, but that this ﬁnding appears
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robust to controlling for the possibility that the policy outcome variables may be impacted by our
chosen instruments also.
The econometric evidence therefore corroborates precisely the distribution of countries across
the quality of policy outcomes that the model predicts, and which was identiﬁed in the descriptive
evidence of the preceding sub-section.
5. Conclusion and Evaluation
This paper has as its starting point the fact that the association between the quality of policy
outcomes reported by countries and the ratings outcomes published by credit rating agencies is weak
at best, and entirely absent at worst.
Strong market incentives preclude the likelihood that this absence of an association is simply a
reﬂection of market failure, or of information asymmetries.
Instead, we present a model in which policy makers respond endogenously to ratings, and in
which the rating agency changes ratings in response to policy changes. We show that for rational,
social welfare maximizing policy makers, the quality of policy outcomes comes to be conditional on
the probability of receiving a high or low rating outcome, as well as the responsiveness of ratings
agencies to changes in policy.
It is important to note that the consequence is that poor policy can occur under high ratings (where
the rating agency shows slow response to policy changes, policy makers have constrained incentives
to maintain good policy), but that good policy can also occur under poor ratings (where ratings
agencies show high responsiveness to improvements in policy, policy makers have an incentive to
respond by better policy choices).
We examine panel evidence for 60 countries for which there are 5 or more Moody rating data
points, over the 1980-2013 time period. Our evidence conﬁrms the prediction of the model: better
policy is observable where Moody’s is more responsive to changes in policy.
Thus far the contribution of this paper lies in accounting for the puzzle with which we opened:
the apparently weak association between the quality of policy and the ratings that risk agencies issue.
But the analysis also carries practical implications for policy makers in sovereigns, for credit rating
agencies, as well as the users of the information issued by rating agencies.
First, recall that for policy makers in sovereigns the positive incentive to pursue sound policy is tied
to the responsiveness of the credit rating agency to policy changes. This creates an opportunity for
sovereigns to signal the credibility of their policy choices. Engagement with credit rating agencies
in order to render information surrounding policy choices maximally transparent, would allow the
rating agency to accurately and ﬂexibly reﬂect the risk class to which the sovereign belongs. Since
this would render the cost of any perceived risk on the borrowing cost of the sovereign immediate,
this would serve to raise the credibility of sound policy choices. In short, for the policy maker,
the implication of our ﬁndings is to increase information transparency to rating agencies, thereby
generating greater ﬂexibility in the ratings of agencies, so as to increase the credibility of any sound
policy choices to the markets.
Second, for the credit rating agencies, the information content, hence the credibility of ratings
is low where ratings do not respond sensitively to policy changes. Rational users of the ratings,
will know that under weak rating agency responsiveness there is no incentive for policy makers to
respond to the ratings, so that both high and low ratings will be poor signals of the quality and
risk of the underlying policy environment. For rating agencies, the implication is straightforward:
preserving the long-term credibility of ratings will require a demonstrable responsiveness of ratings
to new information relevant to policy directions in sovereigns. Use of active signals on positive and
negative outlooks, and the conﬁdence with which these are held over and above the formal risk ratings
is one means of increasing the informational content of ratings that are already in use by the agencies.
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Further consideration by rating agencies to continue to add to the information signals and their nuance
would further increase their credibility. Possibilities here might include identifying in greater detail
the source of changes in the risk environment (political, economic, social, domestic, international),
as well as the strength of any change. As important for rating agencies would be to preserve the
credibility of ratings which do not record changes over long time horizons (eg. for countries that
consistently represent low risk, or high risk for that matter). Again, the rating agency would have
an incentive to signal clearly that relevant information was being consistently being processed and
evaluated.
Finally, the inference for users of risk ratings follows. Ratings should carry greater informational
content where there is evidence of rating agency responsiveness to policy changes. Checking whether
the ratings agencies have historically demonstrated such response may thus carry a positive pay-oﬀ
for users.
179 Johannes Fedderke /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  158 – 182 
6. Appendix A
Rating: Coding: Rating: Coding: Rating: Coding:
C 1 B1 8 A3 15
Ca 2 Ba3 9 A2 16
Caa3 3 Ba2 10 A1 17
Caa2 4 Ba1 11 Aa3 18
Caa1 5 Baa3 12 Aa2 19
B3 6 Baa2 13 Aa1 20
B2 7 Baa1 14 Aaa 21
Table 12: Coding of Moody Ratings
7. Appendix B
Australia Colombia Greece Latvia Pakistan Spain
Austria Croatia Hungary Lithuania Peru Sweden
Belgium Czech Iceland Luxembourg Poland Switzerland
Bolivia Denmark India Malaysia Portugal Thailand
Botswana Ecuador Indonesia Mexico Romania Turkey
Brazil Egypt Ireland Morocco Russia United Kingdom
Bulgaria Estonia Israel Netherlands Singapore United States
Canada Finland Italy New Zealand Slovakia Ukraine
Chile France Japan Norway Slovenia Uruguay
China Germany Korea Paraguay South Africa Venezuela
Table 13: Countries Included in Study
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8. Appendix C
Object of the identiﬁcation test is to use the relationship between an endogenous variable and
observables to make inferences about the relationship between the variable and unobservables.
Consider an outcome variable of interest, Y , which is a function of the latent variable, Y∗, such
that:
Y∗ = Pβ +W ′Γ
= Pβ + X′ΓX + ξ
where P denotes the endogenous variable, β is the causal eﬀect of P on Y∗, W is the full set of
observed and unobserved variables that determine Y∗, Γ is the causal eﬀect of W on Y∗. X is a vector
of observable variables, ΓX the associated causal eﬀect, while ξ is an index of unobserved variables.
Since cov (X, ξ) = 0, is unlikely in general, consider:
Y∗ = Pβ + X′γ + ε
such that γ, ε, are deﬁned such that cov (ε, X) = 0, so that γ captures both ΓX and the relationship
between X and ξ. If P∗ is the latent variable that determines P, specify:
E
(
P∗ | X′γ, ε) = η0 + ηX′γX′γ + ηεε
Now the standard assumption in estimation is that ηε = 0. An alternative would be to require
that ηX′γ = ηε, a formalization of the idea that selection on observables is the same as selection
on the unobservables. While strong, the assumption is no stronger than the standard least squares
assumption.(ηε = 0).
Conditions for ηX′γ = ηε are that the X are randomly chosen from the W, that the number of
elements in X,W, are large and that none dominates the distribution of P or Y , and crucially that:
E (Y∗ − Pβ) = P∗β
E
[
(Y∗ − Pβ) ⊥ X] = (P∗β) ⊥ X
are equivalent. Given the strength of the assumption, Altonji et al (2002) point out that estimation
under the ηX′γ = ηε condition provides lower bound estimates of β, while estimation under the as-
sumption of ηε = 0 (exogeneity) provides an upper bound estimate.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J., 2005, Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in P.Aghion
and S.N.Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, North-Holland, 385-472.
[2] Afonzo, A., 2003, Understanding the Determinants of Government Debt ratings: Evidence for the Two Leading Agencies,
Journal of Economics and Finance, 27(1), 53-74.
[3] Afonzo, A., Gomes, P., and Rother, P.C., 2007, What Hides Behind Sovereign Debt Ratings? Working Paper No. 711,
European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M.
[4] Altman, E.I., and Rijken, H.A., 2004, How rating agencies achieve rating stability, Journal of Banking and Finance, 28,
2679-714.
[5] Altonji, J.G., Elder, T.E., and Taber, C.E., 2002, Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Eﬀectiveness
of Catholic Schools, NBER Working Paper No. 9358.
[6] Arezki R., Candelon B., and Amadou N. R. S., 2011, Sovereign Rating News and Financial Markets Spillovers: Evidence
from the European Debt Crisis, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 11/68 - March 2011.
[7] Baek, I-M., Bandopadhyaya, A., and Du, C., 2005, Determinants of market-assessed sovereign risk: economic fundamentals
or market risk appetite? Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 533-48.
[8] Bhatia, A., 2002, Sovereign credit ratings methodology, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 02/170.
[9] Bisoondoyal-Bheenick, E., 2005, An analysis of the determinants of sovereign ratings, Global Finance Journal, 15, 251-80.
181 Johannes Fedderke /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  158 – 182 
[10] Bloom, D.E. and Sachs, J.D., 1998, Geography, Demography and Economic Growth in Africa, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 2, 207-95.
[11] Boot, A.W.A., Milbourn, T.T., and Schmeits, A., 2006, Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms, Review of Financial
Studies, 19, 81-118.
[12] Borio, C. and Packer, F., 2004, Assessing new perspectives on country risk, BIS Quarterly Review, December.
[13] Butler, A.W., and Fauver, L., 2006, Institutional Environment and Sovereign Risk Environment, Financial Management, 35(3),
53-79.
[14] Cannata, M., 2012, Sovereign debt and rating agencies, Mimeo: Italian Treasury Department – Ministry of Economy and
Finance. Available at: w3.uniroma1.it/ecspc/Cannata.pdf
[15] Cantor, R., and Packer, F., 1995, Sovereign Credit Ratings. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and
Finance, Nova York, v.1, n.3, p.1-6, jun. 1995. Disponı´vel em: http://www.newyorkfed.org/rmaghome/curr iss/1995.htm.
[16] Cantor, R., and Packer, F., 1996a, Sovereign risk assessment and agency credit ratings, European Financial Management, 2(1),
247-56.
[17] Cantor, R., and Packer, F., 1996b, Determinants and Impacts of Sovereign Credit Ratings, Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Nova York, v.2, n.2, p.37-54, dez. 1996. Available in:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/rmaghome/econ pol/1996.htm.
[18] Canuto, O., Dos Santos, P.F.P., and De Sa´ Porta, P.C., 2004, Macroeconomics and Sovereign Risk Ratings, World Bank:
Mimeo. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/ratingsUSP.pdf
[19] Canuto, O., Dos Santos, P.F.P., and De Sa´ Porta, P.C., 2012, Macroeconomics and Sovereign Risk Ratings, Journal of Interna-
tional Commerce, Economics and Policy, 3(2), 1-25.
[20] Cavallo, E.A., Powell, A., and Rigobo´n, R., 2008, Do Credit Rating Agencies Add Value? Evidence from the Sovereign
Rating Business Institutions, Inter-American Development Bank Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) Research
Department Departamento de Investigacio´n Working Paper #647.
[21] Dell’Arricia, G., Schnabel, I., and Zettelmeyer, J., 2006, How do oﬃcial bailouts aﬀect the risk of investing in emerging
markets? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38, 1689-714.
[22] Eichengreen, B and Mody, A., 1998, Interest rates in the North and capital ﬂows to the South: is there a missing link?
International Finance, 1, 35-57.
[23] Eichengreen, B., Hausmann, R., and Panizza, U., 2003, Currency mismatches, debt intolerance and original sin: why they are
not the same and why it matters, NBER Working Papers No. 10036.
[24] Finnerty, J.D., Miller, C.D., and Chen, R-R., 2013, The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads,
Journal of Banking andd Finance, 37, 2011-30.
[25] Frost, C.A., 2007, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the
Agencies, Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 22(3), 469-92.
[26] Gallup, J.L., Sachs, J.D., and Mellinger, A.D., 1999, Geography and Economic Development, International Regional Science
Review, 22(2), 179-232.
[27] Gande, A., and Parsley, D.C., 2005, News spillovers in the sovereign debt market, Journal of Financial Economics, 75, 691-
734.
[28] Ga¨rtner, M., Griesbach, B., Jung, F., 2011, PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
and the Role of Rating Agencies, University of St.Gallen Discussion Paper no. 2011-06. Available at:
http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1106.pdf
[29] Georgievska, A., Georgievska, L., Stojanovic, A., and Todorovic, N., 2008, Sovereign rescheduling probabilities in emerging
markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies’ ratings, Journal of Applied Stattistics, 35(9), 1031-51.
[30] Gu¨ttler, A., 2011, Lead–lag relationships and rating convergence among credit rating agencies, The Journal of Credit Risk,
7(1), 95-119.
[31] Hauner, D., Jonas, J., and Kumar, M.S., 2010, Sovereign risk: Are the EU’s new member states diﬀerent? Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 72(4), 411-27
[32] Hunt, J.P., 2012, Credit Rating Agencies and the ”Worldwide Credit Crisis:” The Limits of Reputation, the In-
suﬃciency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, Mimeo: University of California-Berkely. Available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267625.
[33] INSCR, Integrated Network for Societal Conﬂict Research, 2009, Data Page, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
[34] Ismailescu, I., and Kazemi, H., 2010, The reaction of emerging market credit default swapsspreads to sovereign credit rating
changes, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(12), 2861-73.
[35] Jamarillo, L., and Tejada, C.M., 2011, Sovereign credit ratings and spreads in emerging markets: Does investment grade
matter? IMF Working Papers, No. 11/44.
[36] Kaminsky, G., and Schmuckler, S., 2002, Emerging Market Instability: Do sovereign ratings aﬀect country risk and stock
returns? World Bank Economic Review, 16, 171-95.
[37] Kesenne, S., 2000, The Impact of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 47(4),
422-430.
[38] Kesenne, S., 2007, The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports, an analytical treatment, E. Elgar.
[39] Kiﬀ, J., Nowak, S., and Schumacher, L., 2012, Are Rating Agencies Powerful? An Investigation into the Impact and Accuracy
182   Johannes Fedderke /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  158 – 182 
of Sovereign Ratings, IMF Working Paper WP/12/23.
[40] Kim, S-J., and Wu, E., 2006, Sovereign credit ratings, capital ﬂows and ﬁnancial sector development in emerging markets,
Emerging Markets Review, XXX.
[41] Kuper, S., and Szymanski, S., 2009, Soccernomics: Why England Loses, Why Germany and Brazil Win, and Why the U.S.,
Japan, Australia, Turkey–and Even Iraq–Are Destined to Become the Kings of the World’s Most Popular Sport, New York:
Nation Books.
[42] La Porta R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(6),
1113-55.
[43] La Porta R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1999, The Quality of Government, Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 15(1), 222-279.
[44] Larraı´n, G., Reisen, H., and Von Maltzan, J., 1997, Emerging market risk and sovereign risk ratings, OECD Development
Centre Technical Papers No 124.
[45] Levich, R., Majnoni, G., and Reinhart, C.M., 2002, Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System:
Summary and Policy Implications, in R.Levich, G.Majnoni, and C.M.Reinhart (eds.), Ratings, Rating Agencies
and the Global Financial System, New York: Kluwer Academic Press, 1-16. Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/13249/1/MPRA paper 13249.pdf
[46] Mauro, P., Sussman, N., and Yafeh, Y., 2006, Emerging Markets and Financial Globalization: Sovereign Bond Spreads in
1870-1913 and Today, Oxford: University Press.
[47] McNamara, G., and Vaaler, P.M., 2000, Competitive positioning and rivalry in emerging market risk assessment, Journal of
International Business Studies, 31, 337-49.
[48] Millon, M., and Thakor, A., 1985, Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Information Gathering Agencies,
Journal of Finance, 40, 1403-22.
[49] Noll, R.G., 2002, The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Case of English Football, Journal of
Sports Economics, 3(2), 169-203.
[50] Reinhart, C.M., 2002, Default, currency crises and sovereign risk ratings, World Bank Economic Review, 16(2), 151-70.
[51] Reinhart, C., Rogoﬀ, K., and Savastano, M., 2003, Debt intolerance, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-74.
[52] Reisen, H., and Von Maltzan, J., 1999, Boom and Bust and Sovereign Ratings, International Finance, 2, 273-93.
[53] Remolona, E.M., Scatigna, M., and Wu, E., 2008, A ratings-based approach to measuring sovereign risk, International Journal
of Finance and Economics, 13, 26-39, DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.357.
[54] Rojas-Suares, L., 2001, Rating banks in emerging markets, Institute for International Economics; Washington DC.
[55] Ryan, J., 2012a, How Credible are the Ratings Agencies? Public Service Europe,
http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1341/how-credible-are-the-credit-rating-agencies
[56] Ryan, J., 2012a, The Negative Impact of Ratings Agencies and proposals for better regulation, Working Paper FG1,
2012/Nr.01, SWP Berlin.
[57] Schwartz, S.L., 2012, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, University of Illinois Law Review, vol
2012(1), 1-27.
[58] Sy, A.N., 2002, Emerging market bond spreads and sovereign credit ratings: reconciling market views with economic funda-
mentals, Emerging Markets Review, 3, 380-408.
[59] Tichy, G., 2011, Credit Rating Agencies: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, Intereconomics 2011, 232-62, DOI:
10.1007/s10272-011-0389-0.
[60] Ul-Haque, N., Kumar, M.S., Mark, N., and Mathieson, D.J., 1996, The economic content of indicators of developing country
creditworthiness, International Monetary Fund Staﬀ Papers, 43, 688-724.
[61] Vaaler, P.M., and McNamara, G., 2004, Crisis and competition in expert organizational decision making: Credit-rating agen-
cies and their response to turbulence in emerging economies, Organization Science, 15, 687-703.
[62] Vaaler, P.M., Schrage, B.N., and Block, S.A., 2006, Elections, opportunism, partisanship and sovereign ratings in developing
countries, Review of Development Economics, 10(1), 154-70.
[63] White, L.J., 2012, The Credit Rating Agencies: How Did We Get Here? Where Should We Go?, Mimeo: Stern School of
Business, NYU. Available at: http://www.ftc.gov/be/seminardocs/091112crediratingagencies.pdf
